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INTRODUCTION

E. Allan Farnsworth devoted a substantial part of his career to developing and studying international commercial law,
and played a vital role in the creation of some of its most important instruments. That was why I hesitated, in a Gedenkschrift
honoring him, to present a paper that focused on obstacles to
the fundamental goal of those instruments - bringing uniformity to the legal rules governing international transactions. I
was given further pause by the fact that my chosen illustration
of these obstacles involved the United Nations Convention on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods ("CISG" or "Convention").' This treaty has been called "the most successful attempt to unify an important part of the many and various rules
* Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh School of Law.
1 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of

Goods, Apr. 11, 1980, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3, 19 I.L.M. 671, availableat http://www.cisg.
law.pace.edu/cisg/text/treaty.html [hereinafter CISGI.
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of the law of international commerce." 2 Moreover, Professor
Farnsworth was instrumental in its development, as well as in
fostering an understanding of it. 3 Professor Farnsworth, however, was not simply an important advocate for effective international commercial law; he was also a scholar who could look
with the clearest gaze upon shortcomings and problems in the
fields in which he labored. 4 I believe a clear understanding of
the phenomenon I describe in this paper is critical to progress
toward the important, but difficult, goal of creating truly uniform international commercial law. For that reason I will try,
in my limited way, to emulate Professor Farnsworth's example,
and not shrink from charting some of the stumbling blocks on
the road to that promised land.
The development on which I wish to focus is an example of
what Professor John Honnold, another giant in the field, 5 aptly
labeled the "homeward trend."6 This is the tendency to interpret the CISG, or any uniform international law instrument, in
conformity with the background assumptions and conceptions
2

UN

Peter Schlechtriem & Ingeborg Schwenzer, Preface, in

CONVENTION ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS

COMMENTARY ON THE

(CISG) (Peter Schlech-

triem & Ingeborg Schwenzer, eds., Geoffrey Thomas trans., Oxford Univ. Press
2005) (1998).
3 Professor Farnsworth represented the United States at the United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law ("UNCITRAL") during the period in
which that agency developed the text of what became the CISG, and he was a
United States representative at the 1980 diplomatic conference at which the final
text of the Convention was approved. He published many articles that analyzed
the CISG. See his entries in the bibliography at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg
biblio/alpha05.html.
4 See, for example, E. Allan Farnsworth, Damages and Specific Relief, 27 Am.
J. COMP. L. 247, 249-51 (1979), for his criticism of an earlier draft of what became
Article 28 of the CISG.
5 Professor Honnold served as secretary of the United Nations Commission
on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) during the time in which the CISG was
developed and led the U.S delegation to the 1980 Vienna diplomatic conference at
which the final text of the Convention was approved. See UNCITRAL, The UNCITRAL Guide: Basic Facts about the United States Commission on International
Trade Law 43 (2006), available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/
general/V0650941.pdf. His commentary on the CISG, JOHN 0. HONNOLD, UNIFORM
LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES UNDER THE 1980 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION (3d
ed. 1999), has been called "the most frequently cited text on the CISG." Pace Law
School, CISG Database: New Features, http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/
new-features.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2007).
6 JOHN HONNOLD, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE UNIFORM LAW FOR INT'L
SALES (Kluwer Int'l 1989).
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that the interpreter, trained in a particular domestic legal tradition, brings to the task:
The Convention, faute de mieux, will often be applied by tribunals
(judges or arbitrators) who will be intimately familiar only with
their own domestic law. The tribunals, regardless of their merit,
will be subject to a natural tendency to read the international
rules in light of the legal ideas that have been imbedded at the
core of their intellectual formation. The mind sees what the mind
7
has means of seeing.
As Professor Honnold stated elsewhere,
One threat to international uniformity in interpretation is a natural tendency to read the international text through the lenses of
domestic law. Years of professional training and practice cut deep
grooves. How can we avoid the tendency to think that the words
we see are merely trying, in their awkward way, to state the domestic rule we know so well?8
The danger of the homeward trend influencing interpretation seems particularly acute with respect to Article 79 of the
CISG. This provision catalogues the circumstances in which a
party that has breached a contract governed by the CISG is not
liable in damages for such breach. 9 To qualify for an "exemption," as it is called under Article 79, a breaching party must
prove that a failure to perform was "due to an impediment beyond his control and that he could not reasonably be expected to
have taken the impediment into account at the time of the conclusion of the contract or to have avoided or overcome it or its
consequences." 10 These requirements, the heart of the exemption rules of the CISG,11 are marked by vague and malleable
Id.
John Honnold, The Sales Convention in Action - Uniform International
Words: Uniform Application?, 8 J.L. & COM. 207, 208 (1988). Professor Honnold
has also described the homeward trend as "the danger that local tribunals may
unconsciously read the patterns of their domestic law into the general language of
the Convention" and, most succinctly, "inevitable national bias." HONNOLD, supra
note 5, § 429.
9 See CISG, supra note 1, art. 79.
7

8

10 Id. art. 79(1).

11 Other parts of Article 79 address more specific issues and situations: exemption where the breach is due to a failure of performance by a third person that
a party has engaged to perform all or part of a sales contract (id. art. 79(2)); temporary impediments (id. art. 79(3)); the obligation to give notice of an impediment
(id. art. 79(4)); and the legal consequences of exemption (id. art. 79(5)). In addi-
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concepts and standards. What constitutes an "impediment" to
performance, and when is failure of performance "due to" an impediment? What is the measure of reasonableness when judging whether a party should have taken an impediment into
account, or should have avoided or overcome its consequences?
How much effort and sacrifice in overcoming an impediment
should be expected of a party before the impediment is deemed
"beyond his control"? The interpretative challenges presented
by these questions have driven Professor Honnold to admit that
he "confesses to despair over the power of words to communicate answers to the questions of degree that are intrinsic to our
current problem," 12 and to declare that "[iin spite of strenuous
efforts of legislators and scholars we face the likelihood that Article 79 may be the Convention's least successful part of the
half-century of work towards international uniformity." 13 The
result of the necessarily non-specific and plastic norms adopted
in Article 79 is similar to a Rorschach test on which the interpreter can project his or her subconscious assumptions and
predilections - the perfect environment for the homeward
trend.
The "Rorschach-test" nature of Article 79 is illustrated by
the different views that have been advanced concerning how the
exemption provision applies when a seller delivers non-conforming goods. In what circumstances, if any, can such a seller
claim exemption for his or her breach? If it can claim exemption, what are the consequences? I am no comparativist, but
this issue clearly taps into deep-seated differences between the
Civil Law and the Common Law. German law, for example,
generally limits the availability of damages to circumstances in
which a party was "at fault" for a breach, 14 so that a seller is
liable in damages for delivering non-conforming goods only if,
tion, the subdivision of the CISG entitled "Exemption" includes one other article,
Article 80, which provides: "A party may not rely on a failure of the other party to
perform, to the extent that such failure was caused by the first party's act or omission." Id. at pt. III ch.V § IV.
12 HONNOLD, supra note 5, § 429.
13 Id. § 432.1.
14 See Reinhard Zimmermann, Breach of Contract and Remedies under the
New German Law of Obligations, 48 Centro di studi e ricerche di diritto e comparato e straniero, Saggi, Conferenze e seminari 1, 17-18 (2002), availableat http:
//w3.uniromal.it/idclcentro/publications/48zimmermann.pdf. The breaching party,
however, has the burden of proving that it was not at fault. Id. at 18.
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for example, the non-conformity resulted from the seller's negligence in manufacturing the goods. On the other hand, under
German law the buyer can require specific performance of a
seller (e.g., the buyer can obtain a court order directing the
seller to deliver missing goods, or to repair or replace defective
goods) without regard to the seller's fault, unless performance
has become impossible. 15 In contrast, in the United States, as
in other common law jurisdictions, liability for damages is not
conditioned on fault, but rather specific performance, including
an order requiring a seller to repair or ship replacements for
defective goods, 16 is confined to situations where damages
would not be an adequate remedy. 17 Thus under United States
law, damages for a non-conforming delivery do not depend on
the seller's fault, and an award of damages (rather than an order requiring the seller to repair or to deliver substitute goods)
is the primary and more commonly issued remedy.
II.

BACKGROUND - ARTICLE

79

AND FAULT

Under the Convention, damages, including damages for a
seller's delivery of non-conforming goods, are not conditioned on
a showing of fault by the breaching party. Professor Honnold
has emphasized that the CISG rejects a fault-based approach to
damages: "The Convention thus is based on a unitary, contractual obligation to perform the contract and be responsible for
damages - as contrasted with some legal systems that make liberal use of the idea of fault in dealing with liability for damages
for breach of contract."' 8 That the damages regime of the Convention is based on a "strict liability" rather than fault-based
approach is not controversial. For example, the discussion of
the main CISG damages rules (Article 74) by Dr. Georg Gruber
and Professor Hans Stoll in the English translation of the lead15 Id.

at 10-11.

16 See Harry M. Flechtner, Remedies under the New InternationalSales Convention: The Perspective from Article 2 of the U.C.C., 8 J.L. & COM. 53, 58 n.27
(1988).
17 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 359(1) (1981). This is the
traditional test in U.S. contract law for the availability of specific performance.
See id. cmt. a. In sales of goods, the requirements for specific performance are
satisfied "where the goods are unique or in other proper circumstances." U.C.C.
§ 2-716(1) (2003).
18 HONNOLD, supra note 5, § 427 at 479. See also id. § 26 at 19 and § 276 at
301-02.
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ing German commentary on the CISG describes the Convention's approach to damages as follows: "Following the AngloAmerican model of strict liability, the promisor is in principle
liable for all losses arising from non-performance, irrespective
of fault.. ."19 As the same passage notes, however, the principle of strict liability for damages applies unless "the promisor
who has failed to perform is exempted in accordance with Article 79... CISG."20 In other words, the no-fault damages regime
21
of the Convention is limited by the Article 79 exemption.
Fearing that a broad interpretation of Article 79 could undermine the no-fault principle adopted in the Convention's
damages provisions, Professor Honnold has argued that the language and drafting history of Article 79, specifically the requirement in Article 79(1) that a party's failure to perform must be
due to an "impediment," demonstrate that the provision applies
only where performance has been prevented, and is inapplicable
when a party renders "defective performance," such as delivering non-conforming goods. 2 2 Professor Honnold is at pains to
emphasize the implications of the Convention's no-fault approach for claims of exemption by a seller that has delivered
non-conforming goods:
19 Hans Stoll & Georg Gruber, Article 74, in COMMENTARY ON THE UN CONVENTION ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG), supra note 2, at 746 [here-

inafter Stoll & Gruber, Article 74]. This Commentary is based on the fourth (2004)
edition of KOMMENTAR ZUM EINHEITLICHEN UN-KAUFRECHT

-

although as the Pref-

ace to the English version notes, "[iut is not a mere translation" of the German
work, but is "an independent second edition of the first English edition of 1998."
Schlechtriem & Schwenzer, supra note 2, at v.
20 Stoll & Gruber, Article 74, supra note 19, 2.
21 See Hans Stoll & Georg Gruber, Article 79, in COMMENTARY ON THE UN
CONVENTION ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG), supra note 2, T 1 at

807 [hereinafter Stoll & Gruber, Article 79] ("Article 79 thus constitutes the necessary limitation to the principle of strict liability for non-performance of the contract which otherwise underlies the CISG"); JOSEPH LOOKOFSKY, UNDERSTANDING
THE CISG IN THE USA: A COMPACT GUIDE TO THE 1980 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS § 6.19 at 126 and

§ 6.32 at 139 (2d ed. 2004).
22 HONNOLD, supra note 5, § 427 at 479. In its discussion of the application of
Article 79 when a seller delivers non-conforming goods, the commentary on Article
79 in the leading German CISG treatise explains that "the reason for the restrictive interpretation of Article 79(1), above all in the American literature, is the fear
that an element of the fault principle could be reintroduced into the CISG .. .
Stoll & Gruber, Article 79, supra note 21, 6 at 810 n. 21.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol19/iss1/3
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Unknown defects in goods also present problems of allocation of
loss. Under the Convention the seller is responsible for these
losses .... Loss to the buyer is placed on the seller even when the
seller is not at fault, as when a seller resells defective goods, obtained from a responsible supplier in sealed containers, which the
One pragseller has no reasonable opportunity to inspect ....
matic justification for this result is that the aggrieved buyer (unlike the seller) usually has no practicable recourse against the
supplier. As we shall see . . . , Article 79 does not reverse these
23
rules.
The key role played by Article 79 in determining the role of
"fault" in triggering liability for damages under the CISG, as
well as the sensitivity and importance of the question of fault
versus no-fault approaches, is also recognized in the Commentary on Article 79 by Professor Stoll and Dr. Gruber in the leading German CISG treatise ["Stoll/Gruber Commentary"]:
Article 79 is the result of a difficult compromise between the advocates of an absolute guarantee that the contract will be performed, in accordance with the Anglo-American model, and the
proponents of the principle of fault, characteristic for most of the
continental European legal systems. The compromise must not
be weakened by recourse to principles of liability under national
law when interpreting Article 79 .... 24
The discussion of Article 79 in the Stoll/Gruber Commentary,
furthermore, indicates that the drafting history of the provision
"appears to confirm" Professor Honnold's view that it was not
intended to apply to cases involving the delivery of non-conforming goods. 25 The discussion, nevertheless, concludes that
Article 79 is applicable in such cases, and accurately asserts
26
that this is the "prevailing view."
The divergence of opinion on the scope of Article 79 appears
to be a typical and not very disturbing dispute over the interpretation of a complex treaty. Professor Honnold has evidence
23 HONNOLD, supra note 5, § 423.3.
1 (citations omitted).
24 Stoll & Gruber, Article 79, supra note 21,
25 Id. 1 6.
26 Id. See also id. at 810 n.24. Cases addressing this issue are discussed in
the UNCITRAL Digest of Case Law on the United Nations Convention on the In8, available at http://www.uncitral.org/
ternational Sale of Goods, Art. 79
uncitral/en/case law/digests/cisg.html [hereinafter UNCITRAL Digest of Case
Law on the CISG].

7
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from the travaux prparatoiresof the CISG to back his position
that those who drafted and negotiated the text did not intend
Article 79 to apply to deliveries of non-conforming goods. That
intention, however, was not clearly expressed in the text of Article 79, which states in subpart (1) that the provision applies to
"a failure to perform any . . . obligation[ ].-"27 In such circumstances, it is not surprising that a dispute concerning the proper
interpretation of Article 79 has arisen. The Stoll/Gruber Commentary, furthermore, takes pains to minimize the practical
significance of the dispute by arguing that, although in its view
Article 79 theoretically is available to a seller that has delivered
non-conforming goods, such a seller will seldom be able to satisfy the requirements for exemption under the provision: "Since
the promisor basically carries the risk that the goods are in conformity with the contract, an exemption will only be possible in
exceptional circumstances .... ,28
Later discussion in the Stoll/Gruber Commentary, however, describes an approach that would give Article 79 a critical
role in determining a seller's liability for delivering defective
goods. 29 In my view, the approach contradicts the Commentary's asserted goal of avoiding domestic law influences in the
interpretation of the provision.
III.

APPLICATION OF ARTICLE

79

TO DELIVERY OF

NON-CONFORMING GOODS

The problematic approach in the Stoll/Gruber Commentary
is most clearly illustrated by the discussion of exemption when
there is a sale of "generic goods." 30 The Stoll/Gruber Commentary asserts that a seller who does not itself manufacture the
generic goods (i.e., the seller acts as "only a dealer or a commission agent" who procures the goods from a supplier for resale to
its customer) should be exempt "if he received the goods from a
reliable supplier and the defect could not have been discovered
using methods which could reasonably be expected of a reasona27 CISG, supra note 1, art. 79(1).
28 Stoll & Gruber, Article 79, supra note 21, j 6.
29 Id.
39-40.
30 The term "generic goods" refers to goods that are identified in the contract
by a description that more than one specific item might satisfy (for example, the
sale of a certain model of computer), as opposed to the sale of specified individual
goods (for example, a particular computer identified by serial number).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol19/iss1/3
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ble person in the seller's position and was therefore unavoidable." 3 1 The focus here, clearly, is on whether the seller was "at
fault" for delivering non-conforming goods. If the seller can
show that it took reasonable precautions against delivering defective goods (that is, if it was non-negligent in procuring the
goods), the Stoll/Gruber Commentary asserts that the seller is
not responsible in damages for the breach. 3 2 There is no discussion of the expectations of the buyer and little concern for undermining the no-fault approach of the Convention's remedy
and non-conformity provisions, which concerns Professor
Honnold.
The rationale for the approach in the Stoll/Gruber Commentary - that "it is practically impossible for the seller to ensure the conformity of the goods with the contract if the goods
are directly delivered from the seller's ancillary supplier to the
buyer, as is usually the case in international trade"3 3 - emphasizes its fault orientation and focus on the seller. In stark contrast, Professor Honnold's view highlights the no-fault nature of
a seller's liability for damages if it delivers non-conforming
goods, and specifically rejects exemption for a seller just because the non-conforming goods were furnished by a reliable
supplier and the seller had no reasonable opportunity to discover the defects before delivery. 3 4 Interestingly, the Stoll/Gruber Commentary does not adopt a fault-oriented approach
where problems with a supplier result in a failure to deliver, as
opposed to delivery of non-conforming goods. In cases of nondelivery, the Stoll/Gruber Commentary argues that "the parties
will usually intend that the seller bear the risk of procuring
goods. He is basically not exempted due to his supplier letting

him down.

. . ."35

This, presumably, is true no matter how much

care the seller has taken in selecting the supplier. For sales of
specific goods already in the seller's possession at the time the
contract is formed, however, the Stoll/Gruber Commentary reverts to the view that the seller is entitled to exemption under
Article 79 as long as it was not "at fault" for delivering non31 Stoll & Gruber, Article 79, supra note 21, T 40.

32 Id.

33 Id.
34 HONNOLD, supra note 5,

§ 423.3,

quoted in the text accompanying note 23,

available at http://cisgw3.1aw.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/honnold.html.
35 Stoll & Gruber, Article 79, supra note 21, T118 (footnote omitted).
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conforming goods: "The seller must ... be permitted the defence
that the defect was hidden and could not have been discovered
by methods which a reasonable person in the seller's position
36
could reasonably have been expected to adopt."
In fairness, the examples of a fault-oriented approach to exemption described above are more the exception than the rule.
As was noted, the Stoll/Gruber Commentary itself refuses to
permit exemption based on a lack of fault when it deals with a
failure of delivery caused by a supplier, and it also denies exemption for a delivery of non-conforming goods that the seller
itself manufactures. 37 Furthermore, the Commentary's faultoriented position on exemption when a seller's supplier provides
non-conforming goods is a minority one, as the Commentary itself, to its credit, recognizes. 38 Various authorities, including
several from Germany (many of which the Stoll/Gruber Commentary cites), suggest that a seller bears the risk that goods its
supplier ships directly to the buyer are defective, whether or not
the seller took reasonable precautions against that eventuality. 39 The German Bundesgerichtshof,for example, has found
that, although Article 79 theoretically might exempt a seller for
delivery of non-conforming goods (it avoided giving a definitive
answer on that issue), there was no exemption where the
seller's supplier had shipped defective vine wax (used in grafting grape plants) directly to the buyer. 40 The court held that
39.
36 Id.
37 In that situation, it asserts, the seller "is always responsible for defects of
the kind which occur from time to time during the manufacturing process; the
question of fault is irrelevant." Id. This change of focus, frankly, is confusing: if a
seller is responsible for damages resulting from manufacturing defects, no matter
how much care it took in that process, but can escape liability for damages by nonnegligently procuring the goods from a supplier, the method the seller uses to acquire the goods has a significant impact on the buyer's risks concerning the quality
of the goods. Must the buyer be aware, at the time of contract conclusion, of the
seller's plans for supplying the goods? Suppose the seller's plans change after the
sales contract is formed - e.g., the seller decides to close the manufacturing facility
in which it originally intended to make the goods, and instead procure them from a
third-party supplier?
38 The "overwhelming" view is that "the seller, due to his risk of procuring the
goods, is strictly liable as a matter of course - without any possibility of exemption
- that the goods are free of defects." Id. 9 40.
39 Stoll & Gruber, Article 79, supra note 21, I 40, n.141.
40 Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Mar. 24, 1999, VIII ZR
304100 (F.R.G.), available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/wais/db/cases2/990
324gl.html.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol19/iss1/3
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under the CISG the seller bore the risk of procuring goods that
conformed to the contract, and the seller thus was responsible
for the defective delivery despite its argument that it should be
exempted because it had no chance to inspect the goods and discover the problem before delivery. 4 1 Specifically, the court
found that a non-conforming delivery by a supplier was not "beyond the seller's control" as required for exemption under Article 79, and was a matter that the seller must generally "avoid or
overcome" (thus disqualifying the seller from exemption under

Article

79).42

Commenting on this decision, Professor Peter

Schlechtriem, a general editor of the compilation in which the
Stoll/Gruber Commentary appears, and himself one of the most
important contributors to the development and understanding
of the CISG,4 3 distances himself from the notion that reasonable attempts to assure that goods provided by a supplier will be
conforming are enough to qualify a seller for Article 79 exemption when the goods actually delivered prove defective:
Suppliers, and in turn, their suppliers, -are within the seller's
sphere of influence. As the Bundesgerichtshofcorrectly pointed
out, the seller's liability for them is the same as if he had manufactured the goods himself ....
[A] s long as the risk is within his
economic sphere, the seller is in a better position than the buyer
to carry the risk of damages due to a delivery of defective goods
.... It is a question of an allocation of the risk of damages based
on economic reasons and not only on the basis of control over the
sphere in which damages could arise. This is not only an expansion of the risk allocation under Art[icle] 79 CISG but also an important idea for German law, which in my opinion should have as
consequence the exclusion of a possibility of exemption for the
seller in the case of an undiscoverable defect caused by suppliers
or their suppliers, despite even the most careful inspection. 4 4
41
42

Id.
Id.

43 Professor Schlechtriem represented Germany as a delegate at the 1980 Vienna diplomatic conference at which the final text of the CISG was approved. A
bibliography of his remarkable scholarly contributions on the Convention can be
found at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/alphal8.html.
44 Peter Schlechtriem, Uniform Sales Law in the Decisions of the Bundesgerichtshof, in 50 YEARS OF THE Bundesgerichshof (Federal Supreme Court of Germany): A Celebration Anthology from the Academic Community (2001) (English
translation of this text), available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/
schlechtriem3.html. A later decision of the Bundesgerichtshofalso appears to reserve the question of whether Article 79 applies to a failure to deliver conforming
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What is the proper approach? Although Professor Honnold's position that Article 79 was not intended to apply to a
seller's delivery of non-conforming goods has substantial support in the drafting history of the provision as well as the principles underlying the CISG, the language of Article 79 does not
unambiguously state that its scope is so limited. Case law and
commentary, furthermore, suggest that there is no per se rule
forbidding the application of Article 79 in this scenario. 4 5 In
light of these facts, the approach adopted by the Bundesgerichtshof in the vine wax case and praised by Professor Schlechtriem
- that Article 79 may in some circumstances exempt a seller
that has delivered non-conforming goods, but that the seller
bears the risk that its suppliers will provide defective goods irrespective of the precautions the seller has taken - appears to
be a sensible position which reflects an international perspective and around which a uniform interpretation could coalesce.
The more extreme fault-oriented position of the Stoll/Gruber
Commentary, in contrast, is not supported by either the drafting history of Article 79 or the language of the provision. For
example, shipment of non-conforming goods by a supplier is not
such a rare occurrence that the seller "could not reasonably be
expected to have taken [it] into account at the time of the con-

goods, although it strongly hints that Article 79 should apply in this situation. See
Bundesgerichtshof [BGHI [Federal Court of Justice] Jan. 9, 2002, VIII ZR 304100
(F.R.G.), available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisgwais/db/cases2/020109gl.
html. The Oberlandesgericht opinion from which this appeal was taken (and
which is summarized in the Bundesgerichtshofopinion) seems to have adopted the
approach of the vine wax case to a seller's claim for exemption when it delivers
non-conforming goods furnished by a supplier: the Oberlandesgericht stated that
the seller was liable even if the goods were defective when furnished by its supplier
and the defects could not be detected by the seller. Id. Dicta at the end of the 2002
Bundesgerichtshofopinion, however, may raise some doubt about the continuing
validity of the approach in the vine wax case by hinting that Article 79 might be
satisfied if the seller's supplier was responsible for the defects and the seller could
not reasonably detect the defect before delivery. Id. The passage, however, is (at
least in the English translation) quite ambiguous on this point. See id.
45 See, e.g., the decisions discussed in the UNCITRAL Digest of Case Law on
the CISG, supra note 26, and the authorities cited in Stoll & Gruber, Article 79,
supra note 21, 916 at 810 n.24. See also FRITZ ENDERLEIN & DIETRICH MASKOW,
INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW: UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE
INTERNATIONAL

SALE OF GOODS; CONVENTION ON THE LIMITATION PERIOD IN THE

INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS

320-21
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clusion of the contract." 46 In the vine wax case, furthermore,
the German Bundesgerichtshof found that several other requirements for exemption under Article 79 were not satisfied
merely because the seller's supplier had shipped defective goods
and the seller had no chance to discover the problem before the
47
goods were delivered to the buyer.
My point, however, has less to do with who is right in the
debate concerning the application of Article 79 when the seller
has delivered non-conforming goods, and more to do with the
fact that the positions in the debate tend to correspond to the
domestic law most familiar to their proponents. Both Professor
Honnold's position (that Article 79 is simply inapplicable when
the seller breaches by delivering non-conforming goods, so that
the seller's liability for damages on a no-fault basis cannot be
undercut) and the position in the Stoll/Gruber Commentary
(that a seller is exempt under Article 79 if its supplier provided
defective goods and the seller was not at fault for failing to discover the problem) tend to conform to the rules of the domestic
law in which they were trained. Both sides have been able to
project approaches corresponding to their familiar domestic
conceptions onto the plastic language of Article 79. Of course in
Professor Honnold's case there is substantial evidence that his
position reflects the intention of those who produced the Convention, and there are perhaps none more familiar than he with
the history of the drafting and approval of the text. The approach in the Stoll/Gruber Commentary, however, appears to
reflect the temptation to adopt a position that, because of its
ingrained familiarity from domestic law, seems to the interpreter the sensible and obvious approach, provided the text can
be accommodated to it. Exploration of another issue that has
arisen under Article 79, I believe, confirms the impression that
the approach of the Stoll/Gruber Commentary to the non-conforming goods question is a product of the homeward trend.

46 For discussion of the difficulty of satisfying this requirement, see LOOKOFsKY, supra note 21, at 127-28. For further discussion along these lines, see infra
text accompanying notes 59-61.
47 Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Mar. 24, 1999, VIII ZR
304100 (F.R.G.), available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/wais/db/cases2/990

324gl.html.

13

PACE INT'L L. REV.
IV.

[Vol. 19:29

SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE AND ExEMPTION

Article 79(5) addresses the effect of exemption. It provides
that "[niothing in this article prevents either party from exercising any right other than to claim damages under this Convention." 48 There is consensus that, under this provision, an
aggrieved party can invoke several remedies other than damages despite the other party's rightful claim of exemption. The
remedies that remain available include avoidance of contract, if
the other side's exempt non-performance meets the definition of
"fundamental breach" under Article 25; recovery of interest
under Articles 78 or 84; and, if a buyer has received a non-conforming delivery and has not avoided the contract, reduction of
the price pursuant to Article 50. 4 9 But what about a party's
rights under Articles 46 or 62 to demand that the other side
perform its obligations? This remedy, obviously, is not "damages," and thus under the terms of Article 79(5) would appear to
survive despite a breaching party's exemption. This argument
is strengthened by the drafting history of Article 79. The predecessor to the CISG, the Uniform Law for International Sales
(ULIS), the text of which formed the starting point for the
CISG, cut off a party's right to require performance if the other
side successfully claimed exemption. 50 Equivalent language
was not, however, carried over to Article 79. Proposals to specify in Article 79 that exemption precluded the right to compel
48 CISG, supra note 1, art. 79(5).
49 HONNOLD, supra note 5, §§ 311-12, 435.4; Stoll & Gruber, Article 79, supra
note 21,
45; LoOKOFSKY, supra note 21, § 6.19 at 130 and § 6.32 at 140; Joern
Rimke, Force majeure and hardship: Application in international trade practice
with specific regard to the CISG and the UNIDROIT Principlesof International
Commercial Contracts, in REVIEW OF THE CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG) 193, 216-17 (Pace Int'l L. Rev. eds., 19992000); ENDERLEIN & MASKOW, supra note 45, §§ 13.1, 13.2, 13.4 and 13.6. But see
Denis Tallon, Article 79, in COMMENTARY ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW
§§ 2.10 (C.M. Bianca & M.J. Bonell eds., 1987) (suggesting that reduction of price
under Article 59 "may be regarded as a form of damages" and thus is precluded by
exemption) and 2.10.2 (arguing that, where exempt non-performance is "total and
definitive," the remedy of avoidance "does not make sense any more" and is not
available because the contact is terminated as a matter of law).
50 See ULIS Art. 74(3), available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/
ulis.html (providing that a party's exemption does not preclude the other party
from avoiding the contract or reducing the price of the goods, but failing to preserve the right to require performance). See HONNOLD, supra note 5, § 435.5 at 494
n.27; Stoll & Gruber, Article 79, supra note 21,
46 at 832.
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performance, furthermore, were rejected at the 1980 Vienna
Diplomatic Conference at which the text of the Convention was
51
finalized.
But how can a party be forced to perform when it has
shown, as required for exemption under Article 79, that an impediment has rendered its performance impossible (or, at the
very least, so extraordinarily difficult as to satisfy the very
strict standard for exemption 52 )? The irrationality of this result, combined with a sophisticated reading of the drafting history of the Convention's exemption provision, have led to
agreement among most commentators that a party usually will
not be able to compel performance where the other side is entitled to exemption under Article 79. Professor Honnold, for example, argues that requiring a party to perform when it has
established the requirements for exemption under Article 79
"would be inconsistent with the basic provision that a party 'is
not liable' when performance is barred by an impediment. '53 If
a tribunal orders a party to perform, he potes, it could result in
sanctions "at least as onerous as damages," and "[t]here is no
indication that the legislators intended such an absurd result."5 4 Professor Schlechtriem, in his 1986 commentary on the
CISG, suggests that the absurdity can be avoided by invoking
domestic law limitations on the right to compel performance, in
particular doctrines making the remedy unavailable if performance is impossible: such limitations can be applied in transac51 See HONNOLD, supra note 5, § 435.5 at 494 n.27; Stoll & Gruber, Article 79,
supra note 21, 46 at 832.
52 HONNOLD, supra note 5, §§ 432.1 & 432.2; Stoll & Gruber, Article 79, supra
note 21,
23, 30-32; Tallon, supra note 49, § 3.1. Some argue that the requirements of Article 79 are met only if an impediment has rendered performance im-

possible.

See

Dionysios

P. Flambouras,

The Doctrines of Impossibility of

Performance and clausula rebus sic stantibus in the 1980 Vienna Convention on
Contractsfor the InternationalSale of Goods and the Principlesof European Contract Law: A ComparativeAnalysis, 13 PACE INT'L L. REV. 261, 271-79 (2001).
53 HONNOLD, supra note 5, § 435.5 at 494.
54 Id. Compare Tallon, supra note 49, §§ 2.10 & 2.10.2 (the "unrealistic results" that would follow from allowing performance to be required of a party that is
exempt under Article 79 can be forestalled by positing that a "total and definitive"
failure of performance for which the non-performing party is exempt under Article
79 results in termination of the contract by operation of law) with ENDERLEIN &
MASKOW, supra note 45, § 13.6 (suggesting that "the optimum solution" is "that a
right to performance must not be awarded insofar as the ground of exemption are
in effect," but expressing doubt that this approach could be derived from the
Convention).
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tions governed by the Convention because of Article 28, which
provides that "a court is not bound to enter an order for specific
performance unless the court would do so under its own law in
respect of similar contracts of sale not governed by this
55
Convention."
The Stoll/Gruber Commentary stakes out a complex argument on a party's right to require performance if the other side
qualifies for exemption under Article 79. Its starting position is
that "[ulpholding the right to claim performance where a promisor has gained exemption under Article 79 is entirely sensible
if that is regarded as the basic rule; the different situations in
which a promisor may claim an exemption may, however, require a deviation from this rule."56 Although it rejects recourse
to Article 28 and domestic law limitations on requiring impossible performance, 5 7 the Stoll/Gruber Commentary derives from
the CISG itself principles that preclude requiring performance
in particular circumstances, for example, where specific ascertained goods covered by a contract have been destroyed. 58 In
other situations where an impediment has prevented delivery
or payment, the Stoll/Gruber Commentary indicates that the
buyer retains the right to require performance, but only in a
technical sense for the purpose of preserving the promisee's
"claim to accessory securities or the right to interest." In the
view of the Stoll/Gruber Commentary, the promisee's claim to
performance in these circumstances has not "lapsed," but in order to "avoid absurd results" the claim "is not enforceable for
the duration of the impediment."5 9 The Stoll/Gruber approach
where there has been an exempt failure to deliver or to pay is
55 PETER SCHLECHTRIEM, UNIFORM SALES LAW - THE UN-CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS 101-02 (1986), available at http:l

www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/schlechtriem.html#a77. Accord, Rimke, supra
note 49; Flambouras, supra note 52, at 274-75. See also ENDERLEIN & MASKOW,
supra note 45, § 13.6 at 334 ("We do not think that [using Article 28 to invoke
domestic law limitations on specific performance] is the optimum way but believe
that, in general, it is well-founded and acceptable"). Professor Honnold cites domestic law limitations on ordering performance when such performance is impossible, applicable in CISG transactions via Article 28, as an alternative basis for
denying specific performance remedies against a party who qualifies for exemption
under Article 79. HONNOLD, supra note 5, § 435.5 at 495.
56 Stoll & Gruber, Article 79, supra note 21,
46 at 832 (footnote omitted).
57 Id.
47 at 833.
58 Id.
48 at 833-34.
59 Id.
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quite similar to Professor Honnold's; it even echoes Professor
Honnold's rationale that requiring performance where such performance has been rendered impossible, or so extremely difficult as to satisfy the standards of Article 79, would be an
"absurd result" that must be avoided.6 0
Where, however, a seller that has delivered non-conforming
goods qualifies for exemption (which, as we have seen, would
not be an extraordinary occurrence under its approach), the
Stoll/Gruber Commentary enthusiastically embraces preservation of the buyer's right to require the seller to perform under
Article 46: "The seller who is not responsible under Article 79
for the defects in the delivered goods is not exempt from his obligation under Article 46(3) to repair the goods or, if it concerned a sale of generic goods, his obligation under Article 46(2)
to make a delivery of substitute goods conforming with the contract."6 1 Thus the Stoll/Gruber Commentary posits that a
buyer's right to require performance survives the seller's exemption where the seller has delivered non-conforming goods,
but not (except perhaps in a technical sense) in cases involving
other kinds of breach (e.g., failure to deliver).6 2 Given the premises of the Commentary, this makes perfect sense: by permitting a seller to claim exemption if it was "reasonably ignorant"
that its supplier was furnishing non-conforming goods, the
Stoll/Gruber Commentary permits exemption in the non-conforming goods scenario even though the seller's performance
(delivering conforming goods) is not impossible, or even difficult. Given this premise, it is logical to continue to allow a
buyer who has received defective goods to compel the seller to
60 Id. T148 at 834.
61 Id. %46 at 833. The cited provisions of Article 46 permit a buyer that has
received goods that do not conform to the contract to require the seller either to
repair the non-conformity or to replace the non-conforming goods, subject to certain limitations. A buyer can demand substitute goods under Article 46(2) only
when the non-conformities in the original goods are serious enough to constitute a
"fuidamental breach" under Article 25. A buyer cannot demand repair under Article 46(3) when such a demand "is unreasonable having regard to all the circumstances." Requiring the seller to repair might be unreasonable where, e.g., the
buyer itself could repair the goods substantially more cheaply than could the
seller. See Markus Muiller-Chen, Article 46, in COMMENTARY ON THE UN CONVENTION ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG), supra note 2, T 40 at 549-50;
HONNOLD, supra note 5, § 284.
62 Stoll & Gruber, Article 79, supra note 21, at 833.
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perform (i.e., repair the non-conformities or deliver conforming
substitutes) despite the seller's exemption. Indeed, it would be
a miscarriage of justice to foreclose the availability of such remedies to the buyer.
Of course the fact that the Stoll/Gruber Commentary would
permit the seller to claim exemption even though delivery of
conforming goods was neither impossible nor extremely difficult
raises questions about the premise that a seller should be exempt under Article 79 if it can show that a supplier furnished
non-conforming goods and the seller was reasonably ignorant of
the situation. More questions are raised by the fact that the
Stoll/Gruber Commentary fails to consider how its proposed approach would work in a jurisdiction like the United States,
which restricts the availability of specific performance remedies
such as an order requiring the seller to repair or replace defective goods. Under CISG Article 28, a United States court would
not be required to issue such orders unless the requirements of
United States domestic law were met. 63 The failure of the Stoll/
Gruber Commentary to consider the operation of its proposed
approach in jurisdictions with different domestic approaches to
requiring performance suggests a lack of an international perspective that is contrary to the interpretational norms en-

shrined in CISG Article

7(1).64

At any rate, it is now possible to see the full picture of the
approach in the Stoll/Gruber Commentary to applying Article
79 when a seller has delivered non-conforming goods that were
furnished by a third-party supplier: such a seller can claim exemption provided it was not at fault for the non-conformity, i.e.,
it took reasonable precautions against delivering non-conforming goods by choosing a "reliable" supplier and was reasonable in its failure to discover the non-conformity prior to
delivery to the buyer. The exemption, however, will only relieve
the seller of its liability for damages: unless the buyer exercises
a right to avoid the contract, the seller will remain obligated to
repair or replace the goods or at least be subject to a reduction
in price under Article 50. Compare this to Professor Honnold's
approach, which would always deny the seller an exemption,
See Flechtner, supra note 16, at 59-60.
CISG, supra note 1, art.7(1)("In the interpretation of this Convention, regard is to be to its international characters ....").
63
64
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thereby subjecting it to liability in damages regardless of the
precautions the seller has taken.
V.

ARTICLE

79

AND THE HOMEWARD TREND

The Stoll/Gruber Commentary's vision of how Article 79 applies to a seller who has delivered non-conforming goods that
were provided by the seller's supplier corresponds neatly, at
least in broad outline, to the approach of German domestic law
in this situation: no damages unless the seller is at fault for
delivering the defective goods; regardless of fault, however, the
seller may be required to replace or repair the non-conforming
goods or to undergo Article 50 price reduction, a remedy that
reflects civil law doctrines. 6 5 Of course an equivalent observation might be made about Professor Honnold's application of Article 79 to the non-conforming goods situation: it corresponds to
the American legal approach in that the seller is liable for damages, and any other remedies applicable under the Convention,
without regard to fault. In my view, Professor Honnold's vision
more faithfully reflects the history and intended purpose of Article 79, as well as the principles behind the CISG provisions
governing conformity of goods and remedies; however, since I
too am a United States-trained lawyer, that opinion may not be
terribly surprising. That two quite incompatible views of the
application of Article 79 can be projected onto the text of the
provision illustrates vividly the Rorschach-test nature of that
text. That such contradictory positions appear in two of the
most influential commentaries on the CISG, whose principals
include distinguished academics such as Professors Honnold
and Schlechtriem - scholars who were intimately involved in
the creation of the CISG and who are committed to promoting
(and among the best qualified in the world to achieve) an international perspective on the Convention - illustrates the insidiousness of the homeward trend.
It is worthwhile to trace how the Stoll/Gruber Commentary
projects the fault principle onto Article 79 when dealing with a
seller's delivery of non-conforming goods furnished by a supplier. I have already noted statements that reveal the ethical
perspective behind this approach: "it is practically impossible
65 See HONNOLD, supra note 5, § 313 at 338-39.
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for the seller to ensure the conformity of the goods with the contract if the goods are directly delivered from the seller's ancillary supplier to the buyer."6 6 The implication of this statement
is that it would be unfair to hold the seller liable in damages.
There is no mention of the complementary ethical issue of
whether it is fair that a buyer - who generally has even less
control over or knowledge of the actions of the seller's supplier,
and who is generally also not "at fault" for the non-conformity should suffer uncompensated damage in the situation. The two
issues together, of course, frame the real issue: where neither
the buyer nor the seller is "at fault" for a delivery of non-conforming goods furnished by a third-party supplier, who should
bear the financial risk with regard to losses that the buyer suffers as a result?
In the German domestic system, which forms the background to the Stoll/Gruber Commentary, the presumption, or
the default rule, is that the seller only assumes the risk with
respect to liability for damages of avoiding "fault" in performing
the contract; in other words, the seller will be liable in damages
only if it fails to perform properly with respect to matters within
its control. Within the vague and pliable terms of Article 79, it
is not terribly surprising that this perspective takes over when
dealing with the application of Article 79 to the case of non-conforming goods furnished by a supplier: the usual, normal, "reasonable" presumption, from the German perspective, is that the
seller intends to assume the risk of liability for a non-conforming delivery only if it could have prevented the breach by
taking reasonable action. For this reason, the conclusion that
seems eminently sensible is that "the seller should be exempted
under Article 79 if he received the goods from a reliable supplier
and the defect could not have been discovered using methods
which could reasonably be expected of a reasonable person in
67
the seller's position and was therefore unavoidable."
In my view the emphasis of the foregoing passage on exempting the seller when its breach was "unavoidable" does not
reflect the provisions of Article 79. It is true that one requirement for exemption is that a party claiming exemption "could
not reasonably be expected to have. . . avoided or overcome [the
66
67

Stoll & Gruber, Article 79, supra note 21, T 40 at 829.
Id. at 829-30.
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impediment that caused a failure to perform] or its consequences." 68 Article 79(1), however, also requires that the party
claiming exemption "could not reasonably be expected to have
taken the impediment into account at the time of the conclusion
of the contract."6 9 As noted previously, in my view the failure of
a supplier (even a normally reliable supplier) to furnish conforming goods is not the kind of highly unusual event that cannot be "taken into account" when concluding a contract: 70 if a
seller is unwilling to take the quite foreseeable risk that its supplier may fail to perform properly, it can insert appropriate language into the contract. 7 1 If the seller accepts the risk, i.e., if it
fails to include exculpatory contract language addressing the
risk, it will be liable for the buyer's foreseeable7 2 damages if a
supplier furnishes non-conforming goods even if the seller reasonably fails to detect the lack of conformity. In that case, however, the seller has recourse against the supplier who provided
the defective items. Under the Stoll/Gruber approach, according to which the seller can claim exemption in this situation,
the innocent buyer rather than the supplier who caused the
problem may have to bear, for example, consequential losses
caused by the defective goods. 7 3 Of course the seller's recourse
against the supplier may prove unavailing (e.g., if the supplier
has gone out of business), but as between the seller and the
buyer (who had no direct dealings with the supplier), who
should bear that risk?
68 CISG, supra note 1, art. 79(1).
69

Id.

70 See supra text accompanying note 46.
71 The Stoll/Gruber approach reverses the burden of inserting favorable contract language onto a buyer that wants to hold the seller responsible should a supplier furnish goods with a non-conformity that the seller reasonably fails to detect:
If nothing else has been agreed upon, the [seller's] liability [to deliver conforming goods], like all other obligations of the parties, is subject to the
reservation under Article 79. Accordingly, the seller should be exempted
under Article 79 if he received the goods from a reliable supplier and the
defect could not have been discovered using methods which could reasonably be expected of a reasonable person in the seller's position and was
therefore unavoidable.
Stoll & Gruber, Article 79, supra note 21, 40 at 829-30 (emphasis added).
72 CISG, supra note 1, art. 74 (requiring that damages be foreseeable at the
time of the conclusion of the contract in order to be recoverable).
73 Stoll & Gruber, Article 79, supra note 21, at 829.
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CONCLUSION

This Comment suggests a pessimistic view about whether
the CISG actually constitutes, as described in its Preamble,
"uniform rules," and whether the admonition in Article 7(1) to
interpret its provisions with a view to "its international character and the need to promote uniformity in its application" can
truly be observed.7 4 The example of United States courts offers
no more reason for optimism, as one United States decision on
Article 79 stands as the most obvious, conscious and direct example of the homeward trend that has yet arisen. 75 I have already commented on the forces tending to push the Convention
toward different regionalized interpretations. 76 Professor
Michael Bridge has very eloquently and very aptly observed:
"The challenge facing the CISG is no less than the manufacture
of a legal culture to envelope it before the centrifugal forces of
nationalist tendency take over. '7 7 Analysis of the views on Article 79 in the Stoll/Gruber Commentary and comparison to the
approach in Honnold suggest that the "centrifugal forces of nationalist tendency" have already asserted themselves in even
the most enlightened quarters. 78 Professor Honnold's bleak assessment of Article 79 as "the Convention's least successful part
79
of the half-century of work towards international uniformity"
appears disturbingly accurate.
But there are also hopeful signs, hopeful enough that even
a pessimist must admit they still predominate. One of the
premises of this study is that Article 79 is particularly susceptible to the homeward trend. Thus, diverging analyses of its
meaning may not be a fair indicator of the success of the CISG
in establishing uniform international sales law. The evolution
of new tools that promote a uniform international interpreta74 CISG, supra note 1, pmbl.
75 See Joseph Lookofsky & Harry Flechtner, Nominating Manfred Forberich:
The Worst CISG Decision in 25 Years?, 9 VINDOBONA J. INT'L COMM. L. & ARBITR.

199, 203 (2005).
76 Harry M. Flechtner, Another CISG Case in the U.S. Courts:Pitfalls for the

Practitionerand the Potentialfor Regionalized Interpretations,15 J.L. & CoM. 127
(1995).
77 Michael G. Bridge, The Bifocal World of InternationalSales: Vienna and
Non-Vienna, in MAKING COMMERCIAL LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF Roy GOODE 288
(Ross Cranston ed., 1997).
78 HoNNOLD, supra note 5, § 432.1 at 484.
79

Id.
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tion of the Convention, such as UNCITRAL's ambitious CLOUT
initiative ("Case Law on UNCITRAL Texts")8 0 and the marvelous CISG website maintained by the Pace University Institute
for International Commercial Law, 8 ' bespeak the evolution of a
new template for transnational research and practice.8 2 Indeed, as this paper itself noted, there are good reasons to think
that a truly international perspective on Article 79 itself may
prove stronger than the pull of the homeward trend.8 3 Yet the
task of creating a global commercial legal order that maintains
its uniformity remains a challenging one. Pointing out this undeniable fact in a Gedenkschrift honoring E. Allan Farnsworth
seems fitting because difficulties and errors in the quest for
truly international commercial law could not escape his keen
observation and penetrating mind. Neither, however, could
they daunt his energetic and intelligent pursuit of the goal. We
would all do well to follow both aspects of his example.

80 See UNCITRAL, Case Law on UNCITRAL Texts (CLOUT), http://www.
uncitral.orgluncitral/en/case law.html (last visited Nov. 24, 2007). UNCITRAL's
Digest of case law on the CISG is a particularly helpful tool for those seeking an
international perspective through familiarity with the application of the CISG by
courts and arbitral tribunals around the world. See UNCITRAL Digest of Case
Law on the CISG, supra note 26.
81 See Pace Law School Institute of International Commercial Law, http://cisg
w3.law.pace.edu (last visited Nov. 24, 2007).
82 See Harry M. Flechtner, Recovering Attorneys' Fees as Damages Under the
U.N. Sales Convention (CISG): The Role of Case Law in the New International
Commercial Practice,with Comments on Zapata Hermanos v. Hearthside Baking,
22 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 121, 121-25 (2002).
83 See supra text accompanying notes 37-38.
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